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Family Law: Property Rights of
Unmarried Cohabitants
Oral Olson and Laura Carlson lived together for 21 years, raising
a son to majority and holding themselves out to friends, relatives, and
the public as husband and wife,I yet they were never legally married.
Since Ms. Carlson did not have any income during the period of
cohabitation, substantially all the real and personal property ac-
quired by the parties was purchased with Mr. Olson's earnings.2 Nev-
ertheless, much of this property, including their home, was held in
joint tenancy.' When the relationship terminated, Ms. Carlson
brought an action to partition the parties' accumulated real and per-
sonal property.4 The trial court divided the property equally, finding
an "irrevocable gift from Mr. Olson to [Ms. Carlson] of those assets
purchased solely with his earnings."' On appeal, Mr. Olson con-
tended that the standard law of joint tenancy should apply without
regard to the familial relationship of the parties and that the prop-
erty should therefore be divided in accordance with the contribution
of capital that each had made toward its acquisition. 6 The Minnesota
1. The deed to their house, for instance, listed the parties as husband and wife.
Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 250 (Minn. 1977).
2. The only exception was $1000 supplied by Ms. Carlson's mother for a remodel-
ing project. Id.
3. Mr. Olson supplied the $900 down payment for the purchase of the home, and
a $16,000 mortgage was executed by both parties. Id.
4. MINN. STAT. §§ 558.01-.32 (1976) provide the statutory framework for partition
actions. See note 44 infra.
5. 256 N.W.2d at 255. The contribution of Ms. Carlson to the remodeling of the
home was treated similarly. Id.
6. See id. at 251. Although holding property in joint tenancy, tenancy by the
entirety, or tenancy in common raises a presumption that the parties intended to take
equal shares in the event of a partition, that presumption is ordinarily rebutted by a
showing that one party contributed more to the purchase or improvement of the prop-
erty than the other. See, e.g., Duston v. Duston, 31 Colo. App. 147, 498 P.2d 1174
(1972) (where contributions to property held in joint tenancy by father, son, and son's
wife were made equally by father and son, father was entitled to undivided one-half
interest); Rickards v. Rickards, 53 Del. 134, 166 A.2d 425 (1960)(in action for annul-
ment because of impotency, house held in tenancy by the entirety awarded to wife
because her contribution was larger; husband allowed to recover his contribution);
Williams v. Monzingo, 235 Iowa 434, 442, 16 N.W.2d 619, 623 (1944) ("In a showing of
unequal contribution [by tenants in common, a] presumption arises . . .that the
parties intended to share in proportion to the amount contributed by each to the
purchase price.").
When the parties are legally married, however, some courts have held that the
presumption of equal sharing is not overcome by showing unequal contribution and
that the parties take equal shares unless there has been an express agreement to the
contrary. See, e.g., Leach v. Leach, 167 Minn. 489, 209 N.W. 636 (1926) (in partition
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Supreme Court rejected this contention, holding that an equal parti-
tion of both real and personal property was proper in a statutory
partition proceeding7 and that "the trial court was justified in find-
ing that . . . the parties intended . . . their modest accumulations
• . . to be divided on an equal basis on the theory of an irrevocable
gift." Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 255 (Minn. 1977).
By awarding property to an unmarried cohabitant who had made
no monetary contribution toward the acquisition of that property, the
Carlson court significantly departed from traditional common law
treatment of such parties. Until recently, nonmarital cohabitation
has given rise to judicially recognized rights only upon proof of either
a common law or putative marriage. In those jurisdictions that still
recognize common law marriage, 8 courts will divide the accumulated
property as though the parties were legal spouses9 upon proof that the
action following divorce, husband not entitled to reimbursement for improvements
made to property held in joint tenancy with former wife). But see Rickards v. Rickards,
53 Del. 134, 166 A.2d 425 (1960); Jezo v. Jezo, 23 Wis. 2d 399, 129 N.W.2d 195 (1964)
(presumption that spouses intended to take joint tenancy property in equal shares may
be rebutted by evidence of unequal contribution, although such evidence is not control-
ling).
Between meretricious cohabitants, however, the general rule applies, and a show-
ing of unequal contribution will rebut the presumption that the parties intended to
divide the property equally. See, e.g., Weak v. Weak, 202 Cal. App. 2d 632, 21 Cal.
Rptr. 9 (1962).
7. For a discussion of the problems inherent in this aspect of the court's holding,
see note 44 infra.
8. Only about one-third of the states still recognize common law marriage. See
Comment, Property Rights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin v.
Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1708, 1711 n.33 (1977). In Minnesota a "[l]awful marriage
... may be contracted only when a license has been obtained therefor as provided by
law and when such marriage is contracted in the presence of two witnesses and solem-
nized by one authorized . . . so to do. Marriages . . . not so contracted shall be null
and void." MINN. STAT. § 517.01 (1976)(originally enacted in 1941), as amended, MINN.
STAT. § 517.01 (Supp. 1977). In Baker v. Baker, 222 Minn. 169, 23 N.W.2d 582 (1946),
the court held that this statute precluded application of the divorce statute to unmar-
ried cohabitants.
Commentators have suggested several societal interests advanced by the abolition
of common law marriage, including deterrence of immorality and fraud, and preven-
tion of disease through mandatory premarital blood tests. See Myerberg, Common Law
Marriage, 29 GEO. L.J. 858 (1941); Note, The Passing of Common Law Marriage, 15
TEMP. L.Q. 541 (1941); 30 VA. L. Rlv. 674 (1944). The problems of proof involved in
determining whether individuals were "married" for the purposes of Social Security,
workmen's compensation, and other governmental aid programs apparently acted as
a catalyst for abolition of the doctrine. See Billig & Lynch, Common-Law Marriage in
Minnesota: A Problem in Social Security, 22 MINN. L. REv. 177 (1938). For a discussion
of arguments for and against allowing common law marriages, see Weyrauch, Informal
and Formal Marriage-An Appraisal of Trends in Family Organization, 28 U. CHI. L.
REv. 88, 97-104 (1960).
9. See, e.g., Argiroff v. Argiroff, 215 Ind. 197, 19 N.E.2d 560 (1939) (common law
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parties had agreed they were married' and had thereafter cohabited
or held themselves out as husband and wife." Similarly, under the
putative marriage doctrine, courts have granted quasi-marital prop-
erty rights to unmarried cohabitants upon proof of a good faith belief
that a valid marriage existed.'
2
wife allowed support payments under divorce statute); Baker v. Mays & Mays, 199
S.W.2d 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1946) (common law wife had insurable interest allowing
her to recover under terms of deceased husband's life insurance policy).
10. This agreement (per verba de praesenti) may be either express or implied.
See Roy v. Industrial Comm'n, 97 Ariz. 98, 397 P.2d 211 (1964); Shelton v. Belnap,
155 Tex. 37, 282 S.W.2d 682 (1955). But see Anderson v. Anderson, 235 Ind. 113, 131
N.E.2d 301 (1956)(implied agreement not recognized). An agreement to be married in
the future that is followed by sexual intercourse (per verba de futuro cum copula) is
rarely recognized as a valid means of creating a marriage. See, e.g., Peacock v. Pea-
cock, 196 Ga. 441, 26 S.E.2d 608 (1943) (marriage per verba de futuro cum copula
abhorrent to public policy of state). But see Herd v. Herd, 194 Ala. 613, 616, 69 So.
885, 886 (1915)(quoting Chancellor Kent's statement that agreement in future tense
followed by consummation creates valid marriage).
11. See, e.g., Drewry v. State, 208 Ga. 239, 65 S.E.2d 916 (1951); Anderson v.
Anderson, 235 Ind. 113, 131 N.E.2d 301 (1956); Fahrer v. Fahrer, 36 Ohio App. 2d 208,
304 N.E.2d 411 (1973); 52 Am. JUR. 2d Marriage § 43 (1970). In a few jurisdictions,
courts have recognized a common law marriage solely on the basis of an agreement to
be married. See, e.g., Great N. Ry. v. Johnson, 254 F. 683 (8th Cir. 1918)(applying
Missouri law); Hulett v. Carey, 66 Minn. 327, 69 N.W. 31 (1896).
12. For the purposes of property distributions, most courts treat putative mar-
riages as though they were valid legal marriages and divide the property in accordance
with marriage dissolution statutes. See, e.g., Hager v. Hager, 553 P.2d 919 (Alas. 1976)
(Mexican marriage invalid; property divided equitably in accordance with di-
vorce statute); Figoni v. Figoni, 211 Cal. 354, 295 P. 339 (1931)(though entered into in
good faith, relationship later discovered to be incestuous and therefore void; property
divided equitably in accordance with divorce statute); Buck v. Buck, 19 Utah 2d 161,
427 P.2d 954 (1967) (bigamous marriage annulled; property divided as though parties
had been married). Other courts distribute property according to equitable principles
without regard to the marriage dissolution statute. See, e.g., Sanguinetti v. Sangui-
netti, 9 Cal. 2d 95, 69 P.2d 845 (1937)(quasi-contract); Lazzarevich v. Lazzarevich, 88
Cal. App. 2d 708, 200 P.2d 49 (1948) (parties continued cohabitation after final divorce
decree was entered without their knowledge; woman allowed to recover value of house-
hold services under a quasi-contract theory); Knoll v. Knoll, 104 Wash. 110, 176 P. 22
(1918)(marriage contracted within six months of divorce void; property treated as
partnership property); Buckley v. Buckley, 50 Wash. 213, 96 P. 1079 (1908)(bigamous
marriage void; property divided in "just and equitable" manner).
Some jurisdictions have codified the putative marriage doctrine. For instance,
under Louisiana law, "[tihe marriage, which has been declared null, produces never-
theless its civil effects as it relates to the parties and their children, if it has been
contracted in good faith," LA. CiV. CODE ANN. art. 117 (West 1952), and "[i]f only
one of the parties acted in good faith, the marriage produces its civil effects only in
his or her favor, and in favor of the children born of the marriage," id. art. 118. See
Funderburk v. Funderburk, 214 La. 717, 38 So. 2d 502 (1949) (relying on this statute
to treat property of putative marriage as community property); cf. MINN. STAT.
§ 517.01 (Supp. 1977) (validating marriage performed by one who was not authorized
to perform marriages but whom the parties believed in good faith to be so authorized).
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In the absence of a common law or putative marriage, however,
courts have deemed the cohabitation "meretricious" and have re-
fused to recognize any property rights arising out of the relationship.
The effect of this refusal is to vest full ownership of the jointly accu-
mulated property in the party who holds legal title and to penalize
parties who, because of the confidential, loving, and trusting nature
of the relationship, do not make conscious efforts to establish legal
rights to property acquired and shared during the relationship.' 3
This mechanical and formalistic treatment of the property inter-
ests of unmarried cohabitants has been justified on two grounds.
First, its harsh effects on the noncontributing party are seen as neces-
sary to deter immorality." For a variety of reasons, this rationale has
come under increasing criticism by both courts and commentators.'5
It is not clear that such relationships actually are repugnant to con-
13. See, e.g., Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
14. The refusal to allow recovery in meretricious relationship cases has most
commonly been due to the judge's view of the relationship as repugnant to society's
moral standards. See, e.g., Chirelstein v. Chirelstein, 12 N.J. Super. 468, 483, 79 A.2d
884, 891 (1951) ("Meretricious is the adjective form of the noun meretrix, a prosti-
tute."). Some judges express their disapproval more colorfully:
We are here confronted with a situation in which good morals would
offer no brief in behalf of either party. In fact, if it were possible we would
be inclined to dismiss them both with the Shakespearean denunciation "A
plague o'fn] both your houses!" However, we are compelled by precedent
to reverse the decree of the Chancellor. We do so reluctantly because the
appellant Joe is lucky that he isn't in jail for the crime of adultery and in
our view the manner in which he concluded the affair is reprehensible. By
the same token the appellee Julia Mae has little in the way of good morals
to commend her to the conscience of equity.
Smith v. Smith, 108 So. 2d 761, 763 (Fla. 1959)(brackets in original).
15. Under such circumstances, this court and the courts of other juris-
dictions have, in effect, sometimes said, "We will wash our hands of such
disputes. The parties should and must be left to their own devices, just where
they find themselves." To me, such pronouncements seem overly fastidious
and a bit fatuous. They are unrealistic and, among other things, ignore the
fact that an unannounced (but nevertheless effective and binding) rule of law
is inherent in any such terminal statements by a court of law.
The unannounced but inherent rule is simply that the party who has
title, or in some instances who is in possession, will enjoy the rights of
ownership of the property concerned. The rule often operates to the great
advantage of the cunning and the shrewd, who wind up with possession of
the property, or title to it in their names, at the end of a so-called meretri-
cious relationship.
West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311, 316, 311 P.2d 689, 692-93 (1957)(concurring opin-
ion), quoted in Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 254 n.5 (Minn. 1977). See generally
Bruch, Property Rights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value of
Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101 (1976); Folberg & Buren, Domestic Partner-
ship: A Proposal for Dividing the Property of Unmarried Families, 12 W.LmlrE L.J.
453 (1976).
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temporary mores.'" Moreover, even if they are, it is difficult to see
how the public morals are served by finding the parties equally guilty
of immoral conduct but then, in effect, punishing one party while
awarding the other a windfall. 7 A court's duty to prevent injustice is
certainly as great as its duty to discourage sexual immorality. Fi-
nally, it is doubtful that refusing to recognize or enforce property
rights between meretricious parties actually deters such relation-
ships. Few parties beginning familial relationships, whether legally
married or not, seriously contemplate the termination of the relation-
ship, much less what rule of law will govern the distribution of their
property should they separate.'" If one of the parties is aware of the
rule of law and seeks to obtain the benefits of such a relationship
without subjecting his property to claims of a spouse, the rule deny-
ing relief to the non-title holding partner may actually encourage
unmarried cohabitation.
The second justification advanced to support the traditional rule
is prevention of fraud. Fraud becomes a problem whenever a person
asserts rights to property based on a familial relationship that, in
fact, has never existed.'9 It is important to distinguish the contexts
in which such claims may arise, however. A valid marriage license
may be a convenient administrative tool for determining whether
such a relationship has existed for the purpose of state-conferred
benefits."0 But when only rights inter se are involved, other proof of
confidential family relationships should be acknowledged. Where a
familial relationship between the parties is proved or, as in Carlson,
16. Recent changes in societal attitudes toward unmarried cohabitation are
evidenced by legislative decriminalization of nonmarital sexual activity. See, e.g., Act
of May 12, 1975, ch. 71, §§ 5-6, 1975 Cal. Stats. 131 (repealing CAL. PENAL CODE §§
269a-269b (West 1970) (unmarried cohabitation or adultery punishable as misde-
meanor)). The United States Supreme Court has also recognized changing societal
values by holding that the constitutional right of privacy allows single persons freedom
from governmental interference in their decision whether to have children. See Eisen-
stadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453 (1972). The increase in the number of unmarried co-
habitants in 'ecent years further indicates an attitudinal change. "Estimates based
on 1970 and 1960 census figures suggest that the number of unmarried couples living
together increased eight-fold during the 1960's." Bruch, supra note 15, at 101 n.1.
See generally Folberg & Buren, supra note 15, at 456-58; Glendon, Marriage and the
State: The Withering Away of Marriage, 62 VA. L. REv. 663, 688-92 (1976).
17. See note 15 supra.
18. See Bruch, supra note 15, at 135.
19. Cf. Gilkey, Validity of Common-Law Marriages in Oregon, 3 ORE. L. REv.
28, 46 (1923) ("[The doctrine of informal marriage favors the harlot and the adven-
turess . . . ."); Weyrauch, supra note 8, at 98 ("[An] argument for abolition of
common law marriage is that it would be abused by gold diggers seeking financial
advantages from innocent persons by embarrassing litigation.").
20. The need for such a mechanism was apparently a motivating factor in the
abolition of common law marriage. See note 8 supra.
1978]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
where it is admitted, the danger of fraud inter se is no greater than
it is in a legally sanctioned marriage. In fact, when the trial court is
permitted to look at all the evidence before deciding whether a
familial relationship has existed,' it is more likely that fraud will
be uncovered than when a marriage license is treated as conclusive
proof of such a relationship.
Increasingly skeptical of the supposed dangers of fraud and im-
morality and disturbed by the inequity of a rule that distributes the
property accumulated by unmarried cohabitants strictly according to
legal title, a number of courts have struggled to find a rationale on
which to base a more equitable property distribution. These efforts
have led courts to use legal and equitable doctrines developed in
other contexts to mitigate the harshness of the traditional rule.22 Per-
haps the most expansive and certainly the most widely publicized
decision to employ this approach is Marvin v. Marvin,n where the
California Supreme Court held that an unmarried cohabitant could
sue to enforce an express contract to divide property accumulated
during the relationship.2 4 Going beyond the issue presented, the court
also indicated that a non-title holding party might rely on the doc-
trines of implied-in-fact contract, resulting trust, constructive trust,
and implied-in-law contract to recover property acquired during co-
habitation.2
Although these doctrines may partially ameliorate the harsh ef-
fects of the traditional rule, they are of little practical use to most
unmarried cohabitants. Borrowed as they are from other contexts,
they are not readily applicable to the facts of a typical meretricious
relationship. For example, the theories of resulting" and constructive
21. For a discussion of the relevant factors, see text accompanying notes 62-68
infra.
22. See generally Bruch, supra note 15, at 114-26; Folberg & Buren, supra note
15, at 462-79.
23. 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). For a discussion of
Marvin and its relation to modern trends, see Comment, supra note 8.
24. See 18 Cal. 3d at 674-75, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825. The female
plaintiff and the male defendant (actor Lee Marvin) had cohabited without marriage
for over five years. All property acquired during this time, including over one million
dollars in motion picture rights, was placed in defendant's name. Plaintiff alleged that
under an oral agreement between the parties she was entitled to half the acquired
property and to support payments.
25. See id. at 684, 557 P.2d at 122-23, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831-32. For a detailed
discussion of these and other theories upon which a party to a meretricious relationship
might rely in asserting rights to accumulated property, see Bruch, supra note 15, at
114-26; Folberg & Buren, supra note 15, at 462-79.
26. Although the resulting trust has never been recognized in Minnesota, see
MINN. STAT. § 501.07 (1976) (originally enacted in 1858), some courts have found that
a resulting trust arises where one party pays for the property and another takes legal
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trust 7 can be relied on only when the plaintiff has contributed tangi-
ble property, since contributions of services do not generally give rise
to these trust relationships.? Thus, in the common situation where
title. In such a case, it may be presumed that the purchaser did not intend that the
transferee be sole owner of the property. Applying this theory to a meretricious rela-
tionship, a court may infer from the circumstances that the parties intended to create
a trust with the legal owner holding title as trustee for the person who supplied the
consideration for the purchase of the property. See, e.g., Sugg v. Morris, 392 P.2d 313
(Alas. 1964) (dictum); Flowers v. Anderson, 49 Ill. App. 2d 15, 198 N.E.2d 111 (1964);
Walberg v. Mattson, 38 Wash. 2d 808, 232 P.2d 827 (1951) (property purchased with
man's money but title in woman's name; held that man was intended to be beneficial
owner and title should be placed in his name); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRusTs § 404
(1959).
Application of the resulting trust theory could allow a meretricious spouse to
recover more than a similarly situated legal spouse. When it is shown that the alleged
beneficiary and the alleged trustee are married, the one who holds title is deemed to
have received the property as a gift from the other, and absent a showing that no gift
was intended, the presumption of a trust does not arise. See Becchelli v. Becchelli, 109
Ariz. 229, 508 P.2d 59 (1973); McGean v. McGean, 339 A.2d 384 (D.C. 1975); Hall v.
Bone, 210 Or. 98, 309 P.2d 997 (1957). The gift fiction is not applied when the relation-
ship is meretricious. See Albae v. Harbin, 249 Ala. 201, 30 So. 2d 459 (1947); Masgai
v. Masgai, 460 Pa. 453, 333 A.2d 861 (1975); RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TRUSTS § 442,
comment a (1959); Folberg & Buren, supra note 15, at 471.
27. A court will impose a constructive trust when it finds (1) that a person
holding legal title to property has obtained it through fraud or mistake, either directly
from another or by purchasing it with money supplied by another, and (2) that the
titleholder would be unjustly enriched if allowed to retain the property. In such cases
the legal owner is deemed to be a constructive trustee, holding the property for the
benefit of the person he has wronged. See, e.g., Dietz v. Dietz, 244 Minn. 330, 70
N.W.2d 281 (1955) (mother who tranferred property to son and herself as joint tenants
in consideration for his promise to support her for life held entitled to regain title under
a constructive trust theory upon son's breach of contract). See generally RESTATEMENT
OF REsTrruriON §§ 163-171 (1937); Bruch, supra note 15, at 125-26; Folberg & Buren,
supra note 15, at 473; Jennings & Shapiro, The Minnesota Law of Constructive Trusts
and Analogous Equitable Remedies, 25 MINN. L. REv. 667 (1941).
The element of fraud necessary to establish a constructive trust may be satisfied
by showing either actual fraud or the breach of a confidential or fiduciary relationship
(constructive fraud). See, e.g., Stobie v. Stobie, 116 Cal. App. 2d 360, 253 P.2d 765
(1953); Knox v. Knox, 222 Minn. 477, 25 N.W.2d 225 (1946); Fehrman v. Elison, 32
Ohio App. 2d 258, 290 N.E.2d 190 (1971). A meretricious relationship is not in itself,
however, this type of confidential relationship. See, e.g., Patterson v. Davis, 121 Cal.
App. 2d 152, 262 P.2d 601 (1953). Thus, in the absence of actual fraud, a meretricious
partner must be able to establish the confidential nature of the relationship. See, e.g.,
Humphries v. Riveland, 67 Wash. 2d 376, 407 P.2d 967 (1965).
28. See Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962);
Folberg & Buren, supra note 15, at 472, 474. See generally RESTATEMENT OF RESTTUTION
§ 160, comment i (1937).
The one exception is when one party renders services to a property owner in
consideration for which title is transferred to another. In such a case, the transferee
holds the property in trust for the party rendering the services. See Keene v. Keene,
57 Cal. 2d 657, 666, 371 P.2d 329, 334, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593, 598 (1962).
1978]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
one party to a meretricious relationship works outside the home while
the other party performs services in the home, the trust doctrines
provide no relief for the latter. Although services rendered in an
arm's-length transaction may support a finding of an implied-in-
fact29 or implied-in-law contract," courts have consistently presumed
that household services performed during a meretricious relationship
are gratuitous." An unmarried homemaker is therefore afforded no
protection by these doctrines. The express contract, implied-in-fact
contract, and resulting trust theories are also often inapplicable to
meretricious relationships because they require that the parties
manifest their intent to distribute property in a certain manner.3 2
29. In the context of meretricious relationships, some courts have been willing
to find an implied-in-fact contract to form a partnership, or to pool resources if the
conduct of the parties, particularly the manner in which each contributed services or
capital during the relationship, indicates that they intended to make such an agree-
ment. See, e.g., Hyman v. Hyman, 275 S.W.2d 149 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954)(implied
pooling agreement); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972)(im-
plied partnership); Poole v. Schrichte, 39 Wash. 2d 558, 236 P.2d 1044 (1951) (implied
partnership).
The test for implied-in-fact partnership was expressed in Nicholson v. Kilbury,
83 Wash. 196, 202, 145 P. 189, 191-92 (1915):
The existence of a partnership depends upon the intention of the parties.
That intention must be ascertained from all of the facts and circumstances
and the actions and conduct of the parties. While a contract of partnership,
either express or implied, is essential to the creation of the partnership
relation, it is not necessary that the contract be established by direct evi-
dence. The existence of the partnership may be implied from circumstances
See generally Folberg & Buren, supra note 15, at 466-68.
30. When it is shown that one party has received an inequitable share of property
or services, a court may rely on the theory of implied-in-law contract and order restitu-
tion. The policy underlying this remedy is prevention of unjust enrichment. See, e.g.,
Ward v. Taggert, 51 Cal. 2d 736, 336 P.2d 534 (1959); Continental Forest Prods., Inc.
v. Chandler Supply Co., 95 Idaho 739, 518 P.2d 1201 (1974). See generally Bruch, supra
note 15, at 124-25; Folberg & Buren, supra note 15, at 469-70; see also cases cited in
note 12 supra (applying quasi-contract theory to putative marriages). Meretricious
parties have occasionally attempted to base claims on a quasi-contract, see, e.g., Hill
v. Estate of Westbrook, 39 Cal. 2d 485, 247 P.2d 19 (1952), and the theory was specifi-
cally endorsed in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 684, 557 P.2d 106, 122-23, 134 Cal.
Rptr. 815, 831-32 (1976), but it appears that no court has actually allowed recovery
on that basis.
31. See, e.g., Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593
(1962); Keller v. Keller, 220 So. 2d 745 (La. App. 1969); York v. Place, 273 Or. 947,
544 P.2d 572 (1975); West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311, 311 P.2d 689 (1957). For
criticism of this judicial approach, see Bruch, supra note 15, at 110-14; Weitzman,
Legal Regulations of Marriage: Tradition and Change, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1169, 1185-86
(1974). See also Recent Developments, Meretricious Relationships-Property Rights:
A Meretricious Relationship May Create an Implied Partnership, 48 WAsH. L. REv. 635
(1973), and cases cited therein.
32. See Bruch, supra note 15, at 116-23; Folberg & Buren, supra note 15, at 462,
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Such manifestations are likely to be absent or misleading in a mere-
tricious relationship because its trusting, confidential nature makes
full consideration or expression of the future distribution of the prop-
erty improbable. " Moreover, application of these "intent" theories
requires the parties to undertake the difficult task of proving that
they did not consider sexual activity to be a part of the consideration
for the agreement.
3 4
The Carlson case provides an excellent illustration of the inade-
quacy of the various traditional doctrines as applied to meretricious
relationships. Because there was no evidence of the parties' intent to
distribute their property, the express contract, implied-in-fact con-
tract, and resulting trust rationales were inapplicable, even if the
court had been willing to separate the sexual services from the consid-
eration for the agreement. Since Ms. Carlson's contribution to the
relationship consisted mainly of household services, there was no
judicially recognized contribution of property to which resulting or
constructive trusts could have been applied, and insufficient consid-
eration to support implied-in-law or implied-in-fact contracts.
Perhaps recognizing the inappropriateness of these general doc-
trines, but nevertheless convinced that Ms. Carlson should be able
to recover, the Minnesota Supreme Court determined that the situa-
tion "necessitate[d] the creative application of traditional common-
law and equitable principles. '35 After quoting extensively from the
Marvin opinion,36 the court adopted the mutual irrevocable gift ra-
466-68, 470; notes 26 & 29 supra.
33. See Bruch, supra note 15, at 135.
34. Both express and implied contracts have traditionally been unenforceable by
parties to a meretricious relationship on the ground that nonmarital cohabitation
renders such property distribution agreements illegal contracts for prostitution. See,
e.g., Garcia v. Venegas, 106 Cal. App. 2d 364, 235 P.2d 89 (1951)(dictum); Smith v.
Smith, 255 Wis. 96, 38 N.W.2d 12 (1949). See also Brunel v. Brunel, 64 N.Y.S.2d 295,
297-98 (Sup. Ct. 1946) ("If recognition of the marriage offends public policy, then
enforcement of the agreement would equally operate in the same manner.").
Many recent decisions have, however, relaxed this rule by enforcing contracts
between cohabiting parties if it appears that the illicit sexual relationship formed no
part of the consideration for the agreement. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d
660, 672, 557 P.2d 106, 114, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 823 (1976) ("[A] contract between
nonmarital partners, even if expressly made in contemplation of a common living
arrangement, is invalid only if sexual acts form an inseparable part of the consideration
for the agreement."); Barlow v. Collins, 166 Cal. App. 2d 274, 333 P.2d 64 (1958);
Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Latham v. Latham,
274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976); cf. Annot., 31 A.L.R.2d 1255, 1281-86 (1953) (discuss-
ing enforcement of partnership, joint venture, and pooling agreements). But see Rehak
v. Mathis, 238 S.E.2d 81 (Ga. 1977).
35. 256 N.W.2d at 251.
36. See notes 23-25 supra and accompanying text.
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tionale relied on by the trial court."7 Exactly how such a theory oper-
ates in this context is unclear, however. It does not appear to be based
on traditional gift doctrine, since the court made no mention of the
essential elements of a gift-donative intent and surrender of con-
tro13 -perhaps because there was little evidence of either. 9 Although
the fact that the parties took title to their home in joint tenancy could
have supported an inference of intent to make a gift,4" reliance on that
fact would have been contrary to a previous Minnesota Supreme
Court case that clearly held that placing property in joint tenancy
does not alone establish donative intent.4' Further, since some of the
parties' property was not held in joint tenancy," a presumption that
the parties intended to divide jointly held property equally does not
explain the court's equal division of all their property. The trial
court's rationale for applying the gift theory was further obfuscated
by its determination that the gift to Ms. Carlson was "in considera-
tion for the wifely and motherly services she performed during the
period of their cohabitation. 43 The supreme court did not discuss the
obvious anomaly of a "gift" for which consideration is given.
The Carlson court's use of a theory that is inconsistent with a
realistic characterization of the facts of the case is unfortunate. Be-
cause it did little more than state its conclusions that Ms. Carlson
should recover half the property and that a gift rationale accom-
plishes that result, the law is left in an unsettled state," and future
37. See 256 N.W.2d at 255.
38. See, e.g., Stribling v. Fredericks, Clark & Co., 300 Minn. 525, 219 N.W.2d
93 (1974).
39. Mr. Olson testified that the joint tenancy arrangement was used for survivor-
ship purposes and specifically denied ever making a gift of a fifty percent interest to
Ms. Carlson. See Brief for Appellant at 2, Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn.
1977). "The record contains no testimony substantiating the elements of a gift, [Ms.
Carlson] herself unequivocally testified that there was no gift, and neither of the
parties litigated the issue." Id. at 9-10. Ms. Carlson's brief neither affirms nor denies
these assertions.
40. See Jezo v. Jezo, 23 Wis. 2d 399, 129 N.W.2d 195 (1964). See also note 6
supra.
41. See Kempf v. Kempf, 288 Minn. 244, 179 N.W.2d 715 (1970).
42. "The home and some personal property were in joint tenancy." 256 N.W.2d
at 255 (emphasis added).
43. Id. at 250-51.
44. The Carlson court also authorized the use of a partition action to divide
equally both real and personal property without carefully analyzing Minnesota law
concerning partition actions.
Although the court correctly asserted that the general rule in other jurisdictions
allows partition of personal property, see id. at 255, it ignored the fact that the Minne-
sota statute authorizing partition actions applies only to real property, see MINN.
STAT. § 558.01 (1976). The court cited Swogger v. Taylor, 243 Minn. 458, 68
N.W.2d 376 (1955), for the proposition that partition actions are governed by equitable
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litigants have no predictable guide for determining what facts are
necessary to show the existence of this sort of irrevocable gift.
The extent to which courts, like the Carlson court, have strained
to apply traditional doctrines to meretricious relationships in order
to reach equitable results emphasizes the compelling need to develop
a coherent legal principle under which unmarried cohabitants' prop-
erty rights may be determined. The problem common to all attempts
to fit meretricious relationships into existing legal formulations is
that traditional doctrines, in focusing on the intent or contribution
of the parties,4" are unrelated to the factor that justifies judicial inter-
vention: the parties' relationship itself. Since it is the confidential,
trusting nature of the relationship that makes a person like Ms. Carl-
son vulnerable to the vagaries of happenstance or a scheming part-
ner,46 that relationship should form the basis of a legal principle al-
lowing her to claim rights in the property.
In a variety of other contexts, legislatures and courts have recog-
nized that parties to confidential relationships often do not make
efforts to protect themselves and have developed doctrines that oper-
ate to effect equitable property distributions between such parties.
The clearest expression of this policy appears where the parties' rela-
tionship gives rise to a judicially imposed "fiduciary duty."47 When
such a fiduciary relationship is found to exist, courts carefully scruti-
nize any agreements made between the parties and refuse to enforce
such agreements if it appears that one party to the relationship has
taken unfair advantage of the other." A person seeking to retain
advantages gained by an agreement made during the relationship
bears the burden of showing that the transaction was fair.49
Contracts between parties who have or anticipate a familial rela-
principles despite their statutory base. 256 N.W.2d at 255. The Swogger case, however,
dealt with the methods of distribution available to courts in partition actions and did
not consider the broader question at issue in Carlson: whether equitable doctrines
should be applied to determine the parties' respective shares. See 40 MINN. L. REv.
730 (1956).
45. See notes 26-34 supra and accompanying text.
46. See note 15 supra.
47. See, e.g., Weil v. Neary, 278 U.S. 160 (1929) (attorney-client); Jackson v.
Seymour, 193 Va. 735, 71 S.E.2d 181 (1952) (brother-sister); Voellmeck v. Harding,
166 Wash. 93, 6 P.2d 373 (1931)(director of corporation-shareholders).
48. See, e.g., Westerbeck v. Cannon, 5 Wash. 2d 106, 120, 104 P.2d 918, 924
(1940) (person standing in a fiduciary relationship to another" 'not allowed to derive
any profit or advantage from the relation between them, except upon proof of full
knowledge and consent of such other' ")(quoting 4 R.C.L. Cancellation of Instruments
§ 7, at 493 (1914)).
49. See Roberts v. Parsons, 195 Ky. 274, 242 S.W. 594 (1922); RESTATEMENT OF
CoNTRAcTs §§ 497-498 (1932); J. DAWSON & W. HARvEY, CONTRACTS AND CoNRcr
REMEDIES 535-36 (2d ed. 1969).
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tionship have long been subject to close judicial examination.50 For
example, courts have scrutinized antenuptial agreements to ensure
that one prospective spouse does not, through fraud or undue influ-
ence, cause the other to forgo rights arising out of marriage.5 In order
for such an agreement to be valid, it must have been entered into in
good faith and with full disclosure of the value of the property in-
volved. 2 The need for protection in this situation has been seen by
the courts to be so compelling that if the agreement even appears
inequitable, unjust, or unreasonable, a presumption of fraud or non-
disclosure arises, and the party asserting the validity of the contract
bears the burden of rebutting that presumption. 5 Like antenuptial
contracts, contracts between spouses are carefully examined for signs
of fraud or undue influence. 54
The policy of encouraging fair dealings between confidential par-
ties not only results in the refusal to enforce unjust agreements, but
also operates in the formal familial context to impose affirmative
duties on one party or the other. Thus, in a marriage dissolution
action, one spouse may be required to transfer property held in his
or her name to the other spouse as the court deems just.5 The transfer
of property may be continued in the form of alimony for a period after
the relationship has terminated.55
50. See, e.g., Towson v. Moore, 173 U.S. 17, 21 (1899) (parent-child); Claggett
v. Claggett, 204 Minn. 568, 284 N.W. 363 (1939) (mother-in-law-daughter-in-law);
Prescott v. Johnson, 91 Minn. 273, 97 N.W. 891 (1904) (parent-child); cf.
RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 166(d) (1937) ("A confidential relation is particularly
likely to exist where there is a family relationship .... ").
51. See generally C. FOOTE, R. LEVY, & F. SANDER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON
FAMILY LAW 877-99 (1976).
52. See Del Vecchio v. Del Vecchio, 143 So. 2d 17 (Fla. 1962).
53. See Gamble, The Antenuptial Contract, 26 U. Mmis L. REv. 692, 723-24
(1972).
54. See C. FooTE, R. LEvY, & F. SANDER, supra note 51, at 892-93. This policy is
most strongly expressed in an Iowa statute that voids all contracts between husband
and wife pertaining to property rights. See IowA CODE § 597.2 (1977). In Minnesota,
interspousal contracts concerning real estate are invalid. See MINN. STAT. § 519.06
(1976).
55. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. §§ 518.58-.59 (1976)(giving courts broad powers to
provide for property distribution in marriage dissolution actions).
56. See id. § 518.55. Although the basis for alimony usually has been spoken of
in terms of a duty of the husband to support his wife, see, e.g., Wetmore v. Markoe,
196 U.S. 68 (1904); Swanson v. Swanson, 233 Minn. 354, 46 N.W.2d 878 (1951), as it
has become more common for women to pay for the support of their former husbands,
another rationale for alimony has been suggested-the need of the receiving spouse in
relation to the other spouse's ability to pay, see Lefler v. Lefler, 264 So. 2d 112, 113-14
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (purpose of alimony is "to provide nourishment, sustenance
and the necessities of life to a former spouse who has neither the resources nor ability
to be self-sustaining"). Both need and ability to pay will often vary in proportion to
the extent that property has been distributed disproportionately during the marriage.
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Even when intimate parties have not been legally married, other
judicial and legislative doctrines have been applied to further the
policy of pTotecting those who, because of a confidential relationship,
are not likely to look out for their own interests. When a purported
marriage is annulled because of incest or bigamy, legislatures and
courts have been willing to impose an equitable property distribution
upon the intimate parties despite the absence of a legal spousal rela-
tionship." Similarly, the putative marriage doctrine protects those
with a good faith belief in the legal validity of a marriage, usually by
allowing such persons recourse to the same remedies afforded legal
spouses."
Each ofthese doctrines indicates a strong social policy running
through the law in favor of ensuring fairness between parties who,
because of the confidential, trusting nature of their relationship, are
unlikely to take care of their own interests. This policy applies with
equal force to unmarried cohabitants, and there is no sound reason
why the courts should not demand that such parties treat each other
fairly. " Courts could ensure this fair treatment by first determining
57. See Mixon v. Mixon, 51 Mich. App. 696, 216 N.W.2d 625 (1974)(bigamous
marriage annulled; court relied on marriage dissolution statute to divide property in
fair and equitable manner); MINN. STAT. § 518.54 (1976)(property acquired during
"marriage" that is later annulled to be treated as property acquired during a valid
marriage).
58. See note 12 supra.
59. See Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 121, 134 Cal. Rptr.
815, 830 (1976).
The question whether the courts should require meretricious parties to deal fairly
with one another raises the issue of whether this problem is more appropriately re-
solved by legislative or judicial action. Although a thorough discussion of conflicting
jurisprudential philosophies is beyond the scope of this Comment, it appears that the
case for judicial resolution is relatively strong in this instance. First, there is no clear
legislative mandate precluding judicial recognition of rights arising out of nonmarital
living arrangements. The statutory requirement that all lawful marriages be licensed
and solemnized is not such a mandate since it merely prevents unmarried cohabitants
from enforcing marital rights. See Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249, 252 (Minn. 1977);
Baker v. Baker, 222 Minn. 169, 172, 23 N.W.2d 582, 584 (1946). Second, since the
problem of protecting parties to meretricious relationships is likely to be perceived as
a moral issue, a legislative resolution may be impossible. In such cases, courts should
act to rectify the inequities that have arisen as a result of, or have been perpetuated
by, legislative inaction. Cf. Wright, The Role of the Supreme Court in a Democratic
Society-Judicial Activism or Restraint?, 54 CoRNELL L. REV. 1, 6 (1968) (footnote
omitted):
If the legislature simply cannot or does not act to correct an unconstitutional
status quo, the Court, despite all its incapacities, must finally act to do so.
For "nature abhors a political vacuum as much as any other kind," and if
the legislatures do not live up to their constitutional responsibilities, the
Court must act to fill the vacuum.
Given the inequities that result from the traditional rule according conclusive effect
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whether the parties' relationship has been such as to warrant judicial
protection and, if so, presuming, absent clear evidence of a contrary
intent, that the parties have agreed to treat each other fairly with
respect to property acquired and shared during their relationship. 0
This presumption is consistent with the reasons for protecting such
parties and provides a practical and predictable means for resolving
disputes between ex-cohabitants.
Since the rationale for reapportioning property interests between
unmarried cohabitants is the protection of parties in close and confi-
dential relationships, the party seeking to overcome legal title must
be able to show that such a relationship has existed. Absent this
showing, the parties should be presumed, as strangers- are, to have
dealt with each other at arm's length and to have made a reasoned
"bargain." The standard here proposed for determining the existence
of such a confidential relationship between unmarried cohabitants is
whether the relationship is "sufficiently familial" to warrant a pre-
sumption that they intended to deal fairly with each other.6'
The "sufficiently familial" standard, while necessarily broad in
order to advance the interests of justice in a wide variety of circum-
stances, is a manageable judicial standard of a type not unfamiliar
to the courts. The concept of "family," though perhaps difficult to
define, is not so indefinite that it could not be ascertained by the trier
to legal title and the absence of any sound basis for tolerating those inequities, judicial
intervention is appropriate.
60. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1715-16.
61. The phrase "sufficiently familial" is rapidly becoming a term of art. See
Folberg & Buren, supra note 15, at 480; Comment, supra note 8, at 1716. As is proposed
here, Folberg and Buren suggest that the existence of such a relationship should cause
rights to jointly accumulated property to vest in the parties. In requiring an "actual
and ostensible family relationship and a union that has been in existence for a substan-
tial period of time," Folberg & Buren, supra note 15, at 480, they appear to require
that the parties be "married" in every respect but the ceremonial before the relation
is deemed sufficiently familial. Once such a relationship has been established, Folberg
and Buren's proposal further provides that property divisions between the parties
would be handled in accordance with the state's marital property distribution laws.
See id. at 482-84; accord, Comment, supra note 8, at 1715-16 (by implication).
In both of these latter respects, the approach proposed in this Comment differs
from that of Folberg and Buren. First, the relationship would not have to be "familial"
to a degree sufficient to warrant treating the parties as if they were married; all that'
would be required is that it be sufficiently confidential and trusting to warrant a
presumption that they intended to treat each other fairly. See text accompanying notes
62-68 infra. Second, a finding of a sufficiently familial relationship would not trigger
divorce and partnership statutes with respect to these parties, although such statutes
could provide a court with guidance in exercising its equitable powers. See notes 71-
72 infra and accompanying text. A statutory approach is inappropriate both because
of its lack of flexibility and because it is probably contrary to the Minnesota Supreme
Court's ruling in Baker v. Baker, 222 Minn. 169, 23 N.W.2d 582 (1946).
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of fact. The Washington Supreme Court has suggested that the exist-
ence of a long-term, stable, nonmarital family relationship could be
ascertained by considering such factors as continuous cohabitation,
the duration of the relationship, the purpose of the relationship, and
the pooling of resources and services for joint projects. 2 Judicial de-
terminations in analogous contexts may also provide useful criteria
for defining familial relationships. For instance, in jurisdictions that
recognize common law marriage, courts have identified several fac-
tors as relevant to determining whether a spousal relationship exists.
Predominant among these are cohabitation, 3 which in this context
contemplates not merely an occasional act of sexual intercourse but
living together as husband and wife," and representations by the
parties that they are husband and wife such that others are aware of
the familial relationship." Similarly, in determining the applicability
of the putative marriage doctrine,66 courts have considered such nor-
mal incidents of marriage as time spent together, support of a family,
and assumption of parental roles. 7 All of these factors would clearly
be relevant to determining whether unmarried cohabitants have a
familial relationship.
It should be noted that this list is hardly exhaustive, that none
of these factors should be regarded as indispensable, and that their
relative importance may vary as the combination of factors changes.
They are offered merely as examples of the types of considerations
that should guide the trier of fact in determining whether the parties
have maintained a family-like relationship. Where such a finding is
made, the policies that generally justify judicial protection of parties
in close, confidential, and trusting relationships justify similar pro-
tection for the meretricious couple.68
62. Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059 (1976).
63. See cases cited in note 11 supra.
64. See Kusior v. Silver, 54 Cal. 2d 603, 354 P.2d 657, 7 Cal. Rptr. 129 (1960);
Quinton v. Webb, 107 Okla. 133, 248 P.2d 586 (1952).
65. See Hunt v. Hunt, 172 Miss. 732, 161 So. 119 (1935); cases cited in note 11
supra.
66. See note 12 supra.
67. See In re Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d 714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974)
(by implication).
68. Although the policy of protecting parties in confidential relationships, if
logically extended, would apply to all familial relationships, regardless of the sex of
the parties or the number of persons cohabiting, courts may wish to limit application
of this policy to monogamous, heterosexual relationships. Such a limitation could only
be explained as a deferral to broadly held notions of morality. Although there is
evidence of a rapid change in the attitude of society toward nonmarital cohabitation
between heterosexual couples, see note 16 supra, similar attitudinal changes toward
homosexual or polygamous relationships are not as evident, see, e.g., Doe v. Common-
wealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (1975) (antisodomy statute constitutional as ap-
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Once an unmarried cohabitant has convinced the trier of fact
that such a relationship has existed, he or she should be entitled to
rely on a presumption that the parties have agreed to treat each
other fairly with respect to the property accumulated during that
relationship. 9 Of course, the presumption may be rebutted by clear
evidence of a contrary intent,"0 but absent such evidence, the policy
that demands fairness between intimates in a marital context should
likewise demand fairness between those who, though unmarried, are
no less in need of judicial protection. Thus, upon proof that the cou-
ple has had a sufficiently familial relationship, either party should be
able to petition the court for a decree of specific performance of the
implied-in-law "contract" that would direct the other party to relin-
quish as much property as would be consistent with a contract to deal
fairly with the other party with respect to mutually accumulated
property.
This "fairness" principle has long been used to divide property
accumulated by parties to a familial relationship. The appropriate
considerations are similar to those used under many marriage disso-
plied to homosexuals), aff'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976); Ayres, Miami Votes 2 to I to
Repeal Law Barring Bias Against Homosexuals, N.Y. Times, June 8, 1977, § A, at 1,
col. 4; Carman, Most Think Same-Sex Are Wrong, Minneapolis Star, Nov. 18, 1977, §
A, at 1, col. 2; Lichtenstein, Poll Finds Public Split on Legalizing Homosexual Acts,
N.Y. Times, July 19, 1977, at 17, col. 1. The argument against extending judicial
protection because it would violate public morality thus appears stronger in the latter
case. Nevertheless, since parties to close and confidential homosexual or polygamous
relationships may well need the same protection as persons in more traditional family
situations, a court's duty to promote fairness and justice may conflict with its desire
to discourage sexual immorality, and determining which policy should prevail will not
be an easy task. For an argument that treating parties in pari delicto because of their
"immoral" conduct does not promote public morality, see note 15 supra; text accompa-
nying note 17 supra.
69. Surely it is more sensible to place the burden upon individuals to
state clearly their desire to bring about inequitable results, than to impose
such results upon large numbers of people who live together without mar-
riage with no articulated division of financial responsibility. To do otherwise
is to imply in law an unconscionable contract ....
Bruch, supra note 15, at 136; see Comment, supra note 8, at 1715-16.
70. For example, the parties could form an express contract that either indicates
that no property rights are to be based on the relationship or specifically provides for
a particular distribution of the accumulated property. See Folberg & Buren, supra note
15, at 489 n.209. This type of agreement would be subject to the close examination
usually applied to confidential relationships, see notes 47-58 supra and accompanying
text, but absent fraud or overreaching, it should be enforceable, see Marvin v. Marvin,
18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
Another alternative for avoiding operation of the presumption is to take steps to
prevent the appearance of a familial relationship. Couples could take such precautions
as holding themselves out as single, using their own last names, and maintaining
separate bank accounts. See Comment, supra note 8, at 1718-19 (citing M. KING,
COHABITATION HANDBOOK: LIvING TOGETHER AND THE LAW 19 (1975)).
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lution statutes7' and include the relative fault of the parties, the
contribution of services and property each made to the relationship,
the general financial condition in which the parties will be left upon
termination, and the allocation of responsibility to care for any chil-
dren born of the relationship.72
The facts of Carlson would easily justify a finding of a familial
relationship. The parties had lived together for 21 years, raised a son,
and held themselves out as spouses. In addition, they held their home
in joint tenancy and shared their property without making any effort
to keep ownership distinct. In short, Carlson presents a paradigm
case for the presumption that the parties have agreed to treat each
other fairly. Furthermore, an equal distribution of the property be-
tween the parties is consistent with the enforcement of such an agree-
ment under the Carlson facts. Both parties worked during the rela-
tionship, Ms. Carlson in the home and Mr. Olson in other employ-
ment. Although Ms. Carlson received no remuneration for her labor,
in the absence of evidence to the contrary it is reasonable to presume
that the labor of both parties made the accumulation of the property
possible. At the time of the court's decision, there was no evidence
that one party was in greater need of the property than the other;
both were employed and capable of self-support. 3 Under these cir-
cumstances, an equal division of the property was an appropriate
means of enforcing an implied agreement between the parties to treat
each other fairly.
The Carlson court thus reached what seems to be a just result.
Moreover, by indicating its willingness to take a flexible approach to
a problem that has traditionally and unjustly been resolved mechani-
cally, the court laid important groundwork for a more equitable de-
termination of the property interests of unmarried cohabitants. It is
only the court's rationale that is weak, for it neither explains the
result in Carlson nor provides reliable guidance for the future. The
approach suggested here is intended to meet that weakness through
a rational extension of the long-established policy of protecting par-
ties to an intimate relationship who, because of the nature of that
relationship, do not adequately establish or protect their individual
property rights. By explaining distributions in light of the parties'
actual relationship, the proposal provides a predictable and equitable
means of determining the property rights of unmarried couples with-
out resorting to tortured factual characterizations or inappropriate
legal theories.
71. See, e.g,, MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-603(c) (Supp. 1977); MINN.
STAT. §§ 518.58-.59 (1976); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.330 (Vernon 1977).
72. See Latham v. Hennessey, 87 Wash. 2d 550, 554, 554 P.2d 1057, 1059-60
(1976); Recent Developments, supra note 31, at 644 n.44.
73. 256 N.W.2d at 250.
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